Ethics without Metaphysics

Hilary Putnam is a prominent American philosopher who has significantly contributed to branches of philosophy including metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of logic. He is widely recognized for his semantic externalism, which posits that the meanings of language extend beyond mere mental concepts and encompass aspects of external reality. Putnam's philosophy of mind rejects reductionism and emphasizes the complexities of the mind. Additionally, he staunchly defends realism, asserting that truth and knowledge possess an objective nature.

In this lecture, Putnam critically examines the detrimental effects of ontology on analytic philosophy, particularly in relation to ethical judgments. He proposes the abandonment of ontology as a concept altogether. By examining the works of philosophers from the Enlightenment era to the twentieth century, Putnam illustrates how ethical dilemmas arise within a historical context. Central to Putnam's concerns is the notion of ontology itself—the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of existence. He highlights the negative ramifications of ontology's influence on analytic philosophy, specifically in the convoluted discussions surrounding the objectivity of ethical judgments. Putnam argues convincingly that seeking ontological explanations for the objectivity of mathematics or ethics is fundamentally misguided. He asserts that such attempts to provide extraneous justifications for mathematics and ethics miss the mark and fail to address their true essence.